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On April 3, 2010, the bulk coal carrier Shen Neng 1 ran aground on the
Great Barrier Reef (Reef). A Chinese-registered ship staffed by twenty-three
Chinese nationals,' Shen Neng 1 had picked up 65,000 tons of coal from a port
on the coast of Queensland and was heading to China using the Outer Route of
the Reef when it deviated from its planned course.2 It entered a restricted area
of the Great Barrier Reef Marine Park and ran aground on a shoal.3 It appears
the shipmaster and first mate caused the accident; the shipmaster had deviated
from the ship's intended course in order to take a shortcut, but the extremely
4
sleep-deprived first mate failed to correct course at the appropriate time. He
realized too late that the ship had entered restricted waters and was dangerously
close to the shoal. The ship grounded before he could move it to safety.5
The ship tore into a two-mile-long section of coral and leaked several tons
of oil, seriously damaging the Reef.6 The ecological consequences of the
grounding have been immense. Not only did the Shen Neng 1 release three tons
of fuel oil into the ocean, but it also "crushed and smeared potentially toxic
paint" onto two miles of coral.7 It could take two decades for this area of the
Reef to recover.8 Australian authorities quickly moved to stabilize the ship and
prevent further damage,9 but poor weather and rough seas prevented Australia
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from bringing the ship quickly into a port.' 0 On May 30, the Queensland and
Australian governments finally completed their salvage operation, and the Shen
Neng I left Australian waters.11
In the wake of the Shen Neng 1 grounding, Australian officials and
environmentalists have called for heightened protective measures throughout
the Reef.12 But most of the Reef-including the area where the Shen Neng I
wreck occurred-lies within Australia's Exclusive Economic Zone (EEZ). The
EEZ is the area of water adjacent to a coastal state's territorial sea, extending
up to two hundred nautical miles' 3 out to sea from a coastal state's baseline, or
low-water line.14 Under the law of the sea, Australia has the right and the
obligation to protect marine resources in its EEZ. At the same time, Australia
cannot interfere with other states' traditional right of navigation in the EEZ.
This constraint leaves Australia largely unable to impose or enforce effective
protective measures on ships traversing the Reef.
The difficulty Australia faces in preventing pollution from wrecks in its
EEZ reflects a tension in the law of the sea. As part of the United Nations
Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS),' 5 the international community
established the EEZ in an attempt to balance navigational freedom with coastal
state jurisdiction, including the coastal states' right to protect marine
resources.16 The end result, however, weighs too heavily in favor of the
freedom of navigation. Coastal states lack the ability to impose or enforce
effective antipollution measures before catastrophic accidents occur, even in
EEZ areas with special ecological significance.
Existing structures under UNCLOS provide room for correcting this
imbalance between navigational freedom and coastal state jurisdiction in EEZs.
The International Maritime Organization (IMO), the international organization
that sets maritime rules and standards, may authorize coastal states to impose
protective measures that restrict the freedom of navigation in ecologically
sensitive marine areas.' 7 It has been reluctant to do so in the past, however.
Recognizing the increasing threat posed by maritime trade to dwindling marine
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resources, the IMO should allow increased coastal state jurisdiction over EEZs.
It should permit coastal states like Australia to introduce effective protective
measures throughout ecologically sensitive areas like the Reef.
II. THE EEZ AS A FAILED ATTEMPT To BALANCE COASTAL STATE
JURSIDCTION AND NAVIGATIONAL FREEDOM
The United Nations held a series of conferences on the law of the sea between
1958 and 1982 to negotiate UNCLOS,18 which Australia ratified in 1994.19 One
outcome of this decades-long effort was the creation of the EEZ. The EEZ
reflected a compromise between navigational freedom and coastal states' need
for jurisdiction over marine resources,20 but UNCLOS's resulting balance
weighs too heavily in favor of navigational freedom, leaving coastal states like
Australia unable to protect natural resources. Throughout the mid-twentieth
century, coastal nations "extend[ed] seaward their claims to jurisdiction over
what [was] traditionally . . . recognized as the free seas," arguing that they had
exclusive jurisdiction over territories ranging up to two hundred nautical miles
from their baselines.21 Coastal states have strong incentives to claim
jurisdiction over this water: most fish stocks and oil and gas deposits lie within
two hundred nautical miles of coasts, and most marine, scientific, and shipping
22activity takes place there. But this "ocean enclosure movement" ran counter
to the longstanding international norm that seas must remain free for
23
navigation.
The concept of the EEZ-"the most fundamental change" brought by
UNCLOS24 -was established at the final Conference on the Law of the Sea
(UNCLOS III).25 It converted the area extending two hundred nautical miles
out to sea from a coastal state's baseline26 from a part of the high seas into this
new type of area.27 Under UNCLOS, there are now three types of maritime
18. Lewis M. Alexander, The Ocean Enclosure Movement: Inventory and Prospect, 20 SAN
DIEGO L. REV. 561, 566-67 (1982).
19. U.N. Div. for Ocean Affairs and the Law of the Sea, United Nations Convention on the
Law of the Sea, Chronological List of Ratifications as at 15 November 2010, UNITED NATIONS (Nov.
15, 2010), http://www.un.org/Depts/los/referencefiles/chronologicallists of ratifications.htm.
20. See AUSTL. MAR. SAFETY AUTH., REPORT OF THE GREAT BARRIER REEF SHIPPING
REVIEW STEERING COMMITTEE, REVIEW OF SHIP SAFETY AND POLLUTION PREVENTION MEASURES IN
THE GREAT BARRIER REEF T 2.40 (2001), available at http://www.amsa.gov.au/ShippingSafety/Great
BarrierReefandTorresStrait/GBRReviewReport/Documents/gbr.pdf (noting that UNCLOS
"represents a delicate balance between the increasing and often competing demands of coastal States and
those of traditional freedoms of navigation"); David M. Dzidzornu, Coastal State Obligations and
Powers Respecting EEZ Environmental Protection Under Part I of the UNCLOS: A Descriptive
Analysis, 8 COLO. J. INT'L ENVTL. L. & POL'Y 283, 292 (1997) (explaining that "UNCLOS balances the
coastal state's interests within its EEZ against the maritime interests of other states in that zone"); see
also Kronfol, supra note 14, at 461 (describing the EEZ concept as a "compromise").
21. Alexander, supra note 18, at 561.
22. Kronfol, supra note 14, at 463.
23. Alexander, supra note 18, at 562.
24. Kronfol, supra note 14, at 461.
25. Alexander, supra note 18, at 570. For the first appearance of the EEZ as a concept, see
Kenya, Draft Articles on Exclusive Economic Zone Concept, U.N. Doc. A/AC.138/SC.II/L.10; GAOR,
27th Sess., Supp. No. 21, U.N. Doc. A/8721, at 180 (1972).
26. UNCLOS, supra note 14, arts. 56, 57; see also Kronfol, supra note 14, at 461.
27. Horace B. Robertson, Jr., Navigation in the Exclusive Economic Zone, 24 VA. J. INT'L L.
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zones with different governing legal regimes. Coastal states have a high degree
of jurisdictional control over the territorial sea,2 8 which extends twelve nautical
miles outward from the baseline; here, their authority is limited only by other
states' right of innocent passage. 29 By contrast, coastal states have no
jurisdictional control over the high seas. 30 Jurisdiction in the EEZ falls between
these two extremes. A coastal state may exercise jurisdiction in its EEZ, but
only over resources and economic activities.3 1 Furthermore, in asserting
jurisdiction over its EEZ, a state may not exercise the "nearly absolute
authority" over resources and activities in its EEZ that it may over its territorial
sea 32-it must "have due regard to the rights and duties of other states"
guaranteed by UNCLOS, 33 especially the freedom of navigation.3 4
By creating the EEZ, UNCLOS gave coastal states significantly greater
control than they had previously enjoyed over the waters adjacent to their
territorial seas.35 UNCLOS also made coastal states responsible for protecting
marine resources in their EEZs through national legislation and regulation.36
Despite giving coastal states increased control and responsibility over their
EEZs, the EEZ compromise continues to favor the freedom of navigation over
coastal state jurisdiction-UNCLOS's requirement that coastal states have "due
regard" for the freedom of navigation sharply constrains their ability to impose
and enforce environmental efforts. 37
UNCLOS limits coastal state environmental regulatory efforts in order to
protect the freedom of navigation in three ways. First, UNCLOS stipulates that
any environmental protective measures must conform to international
standards: "[L]aws and regulations for the prevention, reduction and control of
pollution from vessels [must conform] to and [give] effect to generally
865, 865 (1983).
28. Id.
29. Daniel Bodansky, Protecting the Marine Environment from Vessel-Source Pollution:
UNCLOS III and Beyond, 18 ECOLOGY L.Q. 719, 738 (1991).
30. Robert B. Krueger & Myron H. Nordquist, The Evolution of the 200-Mile Exclusive
Economic Zone: State Practice in the Pacific Basin, 19 VA. J. INT'L L. 321, 322-23 (1979).
31. Robertson, supra note 27, at 865.
32. Krueger & Nordquist, supra note 30, at 322.
33. UNCLOS, supra note 14, art. 56(2).
34. Id art. 58(1).
35. Bodansky, supra note 29, at 741; see also Emeka Duruigbo, Reforming the International
Law and Policy on Marine Oil Pollution, 31 J. MAR. L. & CoM. 65, 76 (2000) (noting that coastal states
"recorded some achievements" in jurisdiction over their EEZs); Dzidzornu, supra note 20, at 294
(noting that UNCLOS "recognizes and affirms a coastal state's inherent powers over the natural
resources within its EEZ").
36. Robertson, supra note 27, at 896-97; see also UNCLOS, supra note 14, art. 220(3)
(describing antipollution enforcement powers of coastal states in EEZs); David S. Ardia, Does the
Emperor Have No Clothes? Enforcement of International Laws Protecting the Marine Environment, 19
MICH. J. INT'L L. 497, 534-35 (1997) (describing the obligations of coastal states to conserve and
manage natural resources and to "[determine] the allowable catch of living resources" in EEZs);
Duruigbo, supra note 35, at 76 (noting that UNCLOS "creates legally binding obligations on states to
protect the marine environment"); Dzidzomu, supra note 20, at 292 (noting that UNCLOS "obligates the
coastal state to adopt laws and regulations to prevent, reduce, and control pollution of the marine
environment").
37. Bodansky, supra note 29, at 720; see also Jon M. Van Dyke, Balancing Navigational
Freedom with Environmental and Security Concerns, 15 COLO. J. INT'L ENvTL. L. & POL'Y 19, 28
(2004).
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accepted international rules and standards."38 The source of these international
rules and standards is "the competent international organization or general
diplomatic conference,"39 which is the IMO.40 The benefit to navigational
freedom from having only one source for standards in EEZs is clear: ships
passing through different states' EEZs will always encounter the same
environmental standards and therefore will not need to adjust their equipment,
staffing, or practices.41 The requirement that antipollution measures conform to
international standards, however, restricts coastal states' ability to protect their
own marine resources. When international standards for environmental
protection are insufficient, coastal states cannot act unilaterally to protect their
resources but must instead submit a request and receive approval from the IMO
to implement heightened protective measures.42 Petitioning the IMO is often
futile, since the IMO has been reluctant to alter international shipping rules and
standards to accord with environmental concerns.43 The IMO is "primarily a
forum for merchant marine interests," not for environmental protection." If the
IMO denies a coastal state's request to authorize heightened protective
measures, the coastal state must settle for implementing international standards
that are often insufficient.
The second way UNCLOS ensures that coastal state environmental
efforts do not interfere with the freedom of navigation in EEZs is by limiting
coastal states' ability to enforce protective measures. A coastal state may not
enforce antipollution measures unless the threat of pollution presented by a
vessel in its EEZ "crosses a certain threshold"5-the coastal state must have
"clear grounds for believing that a vessel" has "committed a violation of
applicable international rules and standards for the prevention, reduction and
control of pollution from vessels or laws and regulations of that State
conforming and giving effect to such rules and standards."4 6 Even then, the
coastal state may only "requir[e] the vessel to give information regarding its
identity and port of registry, its last and next port-of-call and other relevant
information to establish whether a violation has occurred."47 It may engage in
more direct enforcement action, such as inspecting a ship, only when the state
38. UNCLOS, supra note 14, art. 211(5).
39. Id. Importantly, coastal states "cannot prescribe national standards of construction, design,
equipment, or manning of vessels ... that do not give effect to generally accepted rules or standards ...
established by the IMO." Dzidzornu, supra note 20, at 299.
40. Robertson, supra note 27, at 899.
41. Paul Stephen Dempsey, Compliance and Enforcement in International Law-Oil Pollution
of the Marine Environment by Ocean Vessels, 6 Nw. J. INT'L L. & Bus. 459, 542 (1984); see also
Andrew W. Anderson, National and International Efforts To Prevent Traumatic Vessel Source Oil
Pollution, 30 U. MIAMI L. REV. 985, 1000 (1975) (explaining that "[p]ractical considerations dictate that
a ship which visits many countries each year should not be subjected to conflicting requirements as to
construction and equipment by each nation, but rather should be required to comply only with uniform
international standards").
42. UNCLOS supra note 14, art. 211(6)(a).
43. See infra Part Ill.
44. Ardia, supra note 36, at 528 (emphasis added).
45. Robertson, supra note 27, at 899.
46. UNCLOS, supra note 14, art. 220(3).
47. Robertson, supra note 27, at 899.
2011] 211
THE YALE JOURNAL OF INTERNATIONAL LAW
has "clear grounds for believing" that a vessel has "committed a violation ...
resulting in a substantial discharge [of pollution]."A If there is "clear objective
evidence" of that violation, the coastal state can "institute proceedings,
including the detention of the vessel."49 But the flag state50 of the vessel
accused of the violation may, within six months of the start of the proceedings,
suspend them and remove the proceedings to the flag state, unless the violation
caused major damage or the flag state "has repeatedly disregarded its obligation
to enforce effectively the applicable international rules and standards in respect
of violations committed by its vessels."5 A coastal state's ability to enforce
environmental rules is therefore significantly curtailed; only when a vessel has
already emitted substantial pollution can a coastal state take any action against
the vessel beyond asking for the vessel's basic information.
Finally, UNCLOS limits coastal state environmental efforts in order to
protect the freedom of navigation by providing coastal states with few options
for imposing protective measures even in navigationally challenging or
ecologically sensitive areas. Article 211(6)(a) provides that where an area in an
EEZ is particularly navigationally challenging or ecologically sensitive, a
coastal state may "petition the [IMO] to permit more stringent regulations" in
that area.52 This clause provides states with few effective options, however,
because requested restrictions cannot include "design, construction, manning or
equipment standards other than generally accepted international rules and
standards."53
In short, UNCLOS protects navigational freedom by placing heavy
constraints on coastal states' jurisdiction in their EEZs. In so doing, the
Convention curtails the ability of coastal states to implement and enforce
measures protecting marine resources.
III. EXPANDING COASTAL STATE JURISDICTION IN EEZs: THE PARTICULARLY
SENSITIVE SEA AREA
UNCLOS has failed to appropriately balance coastal state jurisdiction and
the freedom of navigation. With the creation of Particularly Sensitive Sea
Areas, the IMO took a step toward correcting this problem by expanding
coastal state jurisdiction in limited areas of EEZs, but it has not yet made
effective use of this new framework.
At the request of coastal states,5 4 the IMO passed IMO Assembly
Resolution 720(17), establishing "guidelines for designating special zones and
48. UNCLOS, supra note 14, art. 220(5).
49. Id. art. 220(6).
50. The flag state is the state that registers or licenses a vessel.
51. UNCLOS, supra note 14, art. 228(1).
52. Dempsey, supra note 41, at 545 (citing UNCLOS, supra note 14, art. 211(6)(a)).
53. Robertson, supra note 27, at 904-5 (citing UNCLOS, supra note 14, art. 211(6)(c)); see
also James Peter Aston, Regulating the Environmental and Socioeconomic Impacts of Shipping and
Other Vessel Based Activities in the Great Barrier Reef Marine Park and World Heritage Area 92-93
(2008) (unpublished Ph.D thesis, University of Wollongong), available at http://ro.uow.edu.aul
theses/64/.
54. Bodansky, supra note 29, at 766.
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identifying Particularly Sensitive Sea Areas (PSSAs)."5 PSSAs are "areas with
'ecological, socio-economic, or scientific' importance."5 6 The IMO can
designate areas as PSSAs in states' territorial seas and EEZs.5 ' After
determining that the Reef was an area of ecological, social, cultural, economic,
and scientific importance,ss the IMO designated the Great Barrier Reef the
world's first PSSA in 1990. 5 The area of the Reef covered by the PSSA is
known as the Great Barrier Reef Region, 6 0 which "extends 2,300 kilometres
along the east coast of Queensland and covers an area of 346,000 square
kilometres,"6 passing through both Australia's territorial sea and its EEZ. The
Torres Strait is not part of the Great Barrier Reef Region, but the IMO extended
the Reef PSSA to the Torres Strait in 2005.62
In theory, the PSSA is a powerful tool for protecting environmentally
sensitive areas in EEZs. When an area is designated as a PSSA, a coastal state
can ask the IMO for permission to issue requirements for vessels that would
"impose[] considerable restrictions on the freedom of the seas and passage" in
the PSSA.63 The IMO must approve all protective measures for PSSAs, and
these measures must help protect maritime life or make ships safer.
Resolution 720(17) strongly reflects the language of Article 211(6)(a) of
UNCLOS, but the PSSA designation goes one step further: it allows the IMO to
impose "new or non mandatory measures to be taken in all maritime zones of a
coastal State," including measures that affect design, construction, manning, or
65
equipment standards. The creation of the PSSA mechanism was a step
forward in expanding coastal states' ability to protect marine resources, as it
allows the IMO to impose new restrictive measures in sensitive areas of EEZs.
Nevertheless, the PSSA regime has not lived up to its potential. Because
"[i]dentification as a [PSSA] is nothing more . . . than a qualification and a
basis on which protective measures may be taken" by the IMO,66 an area's
designation as a PSSA has no value if the IMO chooses not to authorize
55. H6lne Lefebvre-Chalain, Fifeen Years ofParticularly Sensitive Sea Areas: A Concept in
Development, 13 OCEAN & COASTAL L.J. 47, 47 (2007).
56. Id. at 48 (quoting IMO, Revised Guidelines for the Identification and Designation of
Particularly Sensitive Areas, Annex ff 1.2, IMO Assemb. Res. A. 982 (24) (Feb. 6, 2006), available at
http://www5.imo.org/SharePoint/blastDataHelper.asp/data id%3D25322/A982% 2824%29.pdf).
57. Robert C. Beckman, PSSAs and Transit Passage-Australia's Pilotage System in the
Torres Strait Challenges the IMO and UNCLOS, 38 OCEAN DEV. & INT'L L.J. 325, 327 (2008).
58. Aston, supra note 53, at 92.
59. Lefebvre-Chalain, supra note 55, at 48.
60. Aston, supra note 53, at xiii, 92; see also Lefebvre-Chalain, supra note 55, at 66 fig.2
(showing the geographical bounds of the Great Barrier Reef Region); IMO, Identification of the Great
Barrier Reef Region as a Particularly Sensitive Area, Annex, IMO Marine Env't Prot. Comm. Res. 44
(30) (Nov. 16, 1990), available at http://www5.imo.org/SharePointiblastDataHelper.asp/dataid%
3D1 7630/44%2830%29.pdf (setting forth a geographical description of the Great Barrier Reef Region).
61. Aston, supra note 53, at 1. The area is also a Marine Protected Area under Australian
domestic law and a Special Area under the International Convention for the Prevention of Pollution
from Ships. Id. at 88-90.
62. The Torres Strait Particularly Sensitive Sea Area, AUSTL. MAR. SAFETY AUTH.,
http://www.amsa.gov.au/MarineEnvironmentProtection/TorresStrait (last visited Dec. 4, 2010).
63. Lefebvre-Chalain, supra note 55, at 50.
64. Id. at 54-55.
65. Aston, supra note 53, at 93.
66. Peet, supra note 60, at 469-70.
2011] 213
THE YALE JOURNAL OF INTERNATIONAL LAW [Vol. 36: 207
protective measures. While the IMO in theory can institute new measures
affecting design, construction, manning, or equipment standards in all maritime
zones of a PSSA-including the EEZ-it has been reluctant to do so in
practice. In the Reef PSSA, for example, the IMO has authorized stringent
regulations only in two very navigationally challenging areas: the northern part
of the Inner Route and the Torres Strait. In the northern part of the Inner Route,
vessels are subject to mandatory pilotage-meaning that they must hire highly
skilled, experienced marine pilots to steer them through the area 6-and to the
Great Barrier Reef and Torres Strait Vessel Traffic Service (REEFVTS),
Australia's mandatory reporting and surveillance system.6 8 In the Torres Strait,
vessels are subject to REEFVTS but not mandatory pilotage.69
Furthermore, the IMO has refused to extend either mandatory pilotage or
mandatory reporting elsewhere in the PSSA. After a container ship grounded
on the Reef outside of the mandatory pilotage area in 2000, environmentalists
called for "compulsory pilotage to be extended for the entire length of the Great
Barrier Reef Marine Park.",70 The governments of Australia and Papua New
Guinea instead petitioned the IMO to authorize mandatory pilotage specifically
in the Torres Strait. Other members of the IMO-especially the United States7'
and Singapore-opposed authorizing mandatory pilotage in the area, arguing
that it would interfere with maritime states' freedom of navigation through the
international strait.72 The IMO came to the conclusion that it could not endorse
mandatory pilotage in the strait "despite the obvious environmental
vulnerability of [the] area and the risk posed by international traffic." 73 it
agreed only to recommend voluntary pilotage.
UNCLOS did not strike the appropriate balance between coastal state
jurisdiction and the freedom of navigation. While UNCLOS gave coastal states
the right and the obligation to protect marine resources in their EEZs, its
requirement that protective measures respect the freedom of navigation leaves
coastal states largely unable to impose or enforce effective protective measures.
Although the IMO could readjust this balance using a mechanism of its own
creation-the PSSA-it has not done so, failing to authorize protective
measures throughout PSSAs. The consequences of the IMO's failure are
serious: coastal states cannot engage in needed environmental efforts even in
EEZ areas that have been designated as having special ecological significance.
67. AUSTL. MAR. SAFETY AUTH., supra note 20, } 3.1.
68. See Aston, supra note 53, at 151; Beckman, supra note 57, at 329; Peter Ottesen, Stephen
Sparks & Colin Trinder, Shipping Threats and Protection of the Great Barrier Reef Marine Park-The
Role of the Particularly Sensitive Sea Area Concept, 9 INT'L J. MARINE & COASTAL L. 507, 509 (1994).
REEFVTS was previously known as the Great Barrier Reef Ship Reporting System (REEFREP). Aston,
supra note 53, at 143.
69. Austl. Transp. Safety Bureau, REEFVTS: Great Barrier Reef and Torres Strait Vessel
Traffic Service (VTS), AUSTL. MAR. SAFETY AUTH., http://www.amsa.gov.aulshippingsafety/
REEFVTS/ (last visited Oct. 1, 2010).
70. AUSTL. MAR. SAFETY AUTH., supra note 20,1 3.12.
71. The United States is not a party to UNCLOS but is a member of the IMO.
72. Julian Roberts, Compulsory Pilotage in International Straits: The Torres Strait PSSA
Proposal, 37 OCEAN DEV. & INT'L L. 93, 93 (2006).
73. Id. at 106.
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IV. THE NEED To FURTHER EXPAND COASTAL STATE JURISDICTION IN EEZs
The IMO should strengthen the protective power of coastal states by
authorizing restrictive measures where needed throughout PSSAs. In Australia,
the IMO should authorize mandatory pilotage and reporting throughout the
Reef. These measures would help prevent accidents like the Shen Neng I
grounding. The institution of mandatory pilotage and reporting requirements in
portions of the Reef was a "significant step forward in reducing the risk of
major oil spills." 74 The accident rate has fallen by over fifty percent in the
northern part of the Inner Route since mandatory pilotage was introduced
there." REEFVTS "has the capability to predict potential traffic conflicts ahead
of time and advise on appropriate action such as when a ship may be standing
into shallow water or deviating from a recommended route."76 One expert
estimated that the system "averted at least five near misses" from 2002 to
2005.n7
Indeed, Australia could probably have prevented the Shen Neng I wreck
if it had employed mandatory pilotage and mandatory reporting throughout the
Reef. Pilotage would have been of great help to the Shen Neng 1, since a
marine pilot would likely have avoided the mistakes committed by the crew.
Marine pilots "have highly developed navigation and ship handling skills, as
well as intimate knowledge of the local area and its environment"78-in
contrast to the sleep-deprived first mate of the Shen Neng 1, who had never
before navigated the passage his shipmaster was attempting to use as a short
cut. REEFVTS also could have prevented the accident; if the Shen Neng 1 crew
had participated in REEFVTS, Australia could have alerted the crew to change
course before the ship grounded. When the shipmaster changed the Shen Neng
I's route, he did not input a new route into the ship's GPS unit, so the ship's
alarms did not sound when the ship veered off the new route, and the crew did
not realize that that the ship was in peril until it had already grounded.79
Australia's REEFVTS system prevents such errors-it automatically detects
when a ship veers off course and notifies the crew.
Because the IMO has not permitted mandatory pilotage or reporting in the
area of the Reef where the Shen Neng 1 wreck occurred, Australia could take
no effective measures to prevent the accident. Instead, Australia could only
respond to the accident after it had already occurred, an inadequate tool for
fighting catastrophic marine pollution. On April 14, Australian police arrested
Shen Neng I's shipmaster, charging him with "being liable for a vessel causing
damage in a marine park," and its chief officer, charging him with "the more
serious breach of being in charge of the vessel at the time the accident
74. Wendy Craik, Protecting the Great Barrier Reef from an Oil Spill 9 (undated) (unpublished
conference paper) (on file with the International Oil Spill Conference), available at http://www.iosc.org/
Papers/01 751 .pdf (last visited Dec. 8, 2010).
75. Aston, supra note 53, at 151.
76. Id at 153.
77. Id.
78. AusTL. MAR. SAFETY AUTH., supra note 20, 3.1.
79. AUsTL. TRANSP. SAFETY BUREAU, supra note 1, at 4-6.
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occurred.,,8 0 Both men could be fined if convicted-$51,200 and $205,000
respectively-and the chief officer could be sentenced to three years in
prison.81 COSCO, the Chinese-owned corporation that owns the Shen Neng 1,
also faces a $1 million fine.82 Liability is a limited tool, however, because it
only addresses catastrophes that have already occurred, and it does not
adequately compensate for "irreversible" environmental harm. It is more
effective to prevent environmental damages than to respond to them after the
fact.84
Australia would be better able to prevent accidents like the Shen Neng 1
grounding if the IMO were to authorize mandatory pilotage and reporting
throughout the Reef. However, Australia faces major obstacles in convincing
the IMO to authorize these measures. First, as noted above, the IMO has
refused to grant Australia permission to impose protective measures anywhere
but in the most navigationally hazardous parts of the Reef. The Outer Route,
where the Shen Neng I wreck occurred, is not navigationally challenging; it is
"considerably simpler to navigate" than the Inner Route. 5 A sleep-deprived
first mate-not ocean dangers-likely caused the grounding of the Shen Neng
1. Furthermore, Australia has not argued that the Outer Route is more
ecologically sensitive than the areas where the IMO has previously refused to
authorize mandatory pilotage. Finally, other states in the IMO would likely
oppose any enhanced protective measures in the Reef, arguing that the cost of
enhanced environmental protection would unduly infringe upon maritime
86
states' ability to navigate freely through Australia's EEZ. Tracking and
reporting mechanisms, for example, might require that ships be fitted with
expensive new technology. Mandatory pilotage would require vessels to hire
experienced pilots, an expensive endeavor. Perhaps anticipating Australia's
requests for heightened regulation, the IMO recently reiterated that it can only
recommend, not require, compulsory pilotage in the Outer Route.87
Nevertheless, the increasing threat posed by maritime trade to dwindling
marine resources justifies enhancing coastal state jurisdiction over EEZs.
80. Meraiah Foley, Australia Arrests Chinese Crew ofShip in ReefAccident, N.Y. TIMES, Apr.
14, 2010, at A15. Since there was objective evidence that the Chinese carrier had violated Australian
law by entering a prohibited area, Australia had the authority under Article 220(6) of UNCLOS to
institute domestic proceedings against the ship.
81. Id.
82. Kristie Thong, Cosco Could Face US$1m Fine, PROCUREMENTASIA (Apr. 5, 2010),
http://www.procurement-online.com/news/18830.
83. Anderson, supra note 41, at 987; see also Steve Raaymakers, Ship Sourced Oil Pollution
in the Great Barrier Reef Causes, Frequency, Response and Prevention, in HULLS, HAZARDS AND
HARD QUESTIONS: SHIPPING IN THE GREAT BARRIER REEF: REDUCING THE RISK OF SPILLING OIL AND
OTHER HAZARDOUS SUBSTANCES 11, 16 (Peter Ottesen ed., 1994), available at http://www.gbrmpa.gov
.au/ datalassets/pdf file/0010/4213/wsO19_paper_01.pdf (noting the difficulties in responding to oil
spills after they have occurred).
84. Raaymakers, supra note 83.
85. Aston, supra note 53, at 28.
86. The Australian government itself has expressed concerns about the costs related to
extending compulsory pilotage. AUSTL. MAR. SAFETY AUTH., supra note 20, f 3.43-3.53.




Coastal Jurisdiction Under UNCLOS
Shipping in the Reef poses a serious environmental threat, harming marine life
and human livelihoods in the region. This presents a coastal state like
Australia with two impossible alternatives. It cannot cease to trade, as it is
dependent on international shipping. 89 At the same time, it cannot permit traffic
to destroy the Reef, "a priceless asset both nationally and internationally" that
"sustains a variety of commercial and recreational activities and livelihoods." 90
Australia has an obligation under UNCLOS to protect the natural resources in
its EEZ and guard itself against costly and environmentally devastating
accidents like the Shen Neng I grounding. Mandatory pilotage and reporting
offer a solution-they provide two tested means of preventing catastrophic
accidents while still permitting marine traffic to pass through Australia's water.
V. CONCLUSION
UNCLOS created the EEZ as a compromise after nearly thirty years of
debate about how to balance coastal state jurisdiction with the traditional
freedom of the sea. In the twenty years since the ratification of UNCLOS,
international shipping has increased dramatically while the global marine
environment has degraded rapidly. For example, one third of coral reef species
are now facing extinction. 91 The balance UNCLOS struck is no longer
sufficient to permit coastal states to protect their natural resources-their right
and responsibility under UNCLOS. The Shen Neng 1 incident illustrates this
problem: while protective measures like mandatory reportage and REEFVTS-
which are authorized elsewhere in the Reef-could prevent similar accidents,
the IMO has not authorized the use of these tools throughout the Reef PSSA.
Coastal states must be given the ability to protect the natural resources of
their EEZs. The IMO can give them this ability, allowing states to protect their
natural reasons while continuing to respect navigational freedom. The IMO
should act under Resolution 720(17) to authorize protective measures
uniformly throughout PSSAs. In Australia, the IMO should authorize
mandatory pilotage and reporting throughout the Reef, enabling it to prevent
environmental disasters like the Shen Neng I grounding before they occur.
88. Aston, supra note 53, at 36, 46.
89. Gregory French, Protecting the Marine Environment of the Great Barrier Reef What Is
the Role of International Law?, in HULLS, HAZARDS AND HARD QUESTIONS: SHIPPING IN THE GREAT
BARRIER REEF: REDUCING THE RISK OF SPILLING OIL AND OTHER HAZARDOUS SUBSTANCES, supra
note 83, at 132, 132, available at http://www.gbrmpa.gov.auldata/assets/pdffile/0014/4226/wsO9
paperl 11.pdf.
90. Aston, supra note 53, at 1.
91. Jenny Marder, Study: One-third of Coral Reef Species Face Extinction, PBS (July 11,
2008), http://www.pbs.org/newshour/updates/science/july-dec08/coral_07-1 .html.
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